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In what way does the approach differ from Dennett's?

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The theory is extremely close to Dennett's: in particular it strongly endorses heterophenomenology, that is, the idea that people do not have privileged access to their own sensations, and that (access-) consciousness is a stance one takes to account for other people's and one's own behavior.

What the sensorimotor theory adds beyond Dennett is a concept (namely skill) that provides a natural way to explain the perceived phenomenal quality of sensations. The differences between skills explains the differences in sensations within and between different sensory modalities. Two aspects of sensorimotor skills that we call "corporality" and "alerting capacity" explain why sensations have a sensory "presence" that make them very different from other mental activities.

These additions eliminate the criticism that can be made against Dennett of "explaining away" consciousness. Now we can explain why there is a feel to sensations, rather than no feel, and we can explain what the feels are like and why they differ the way they do. In other words we have a handle on phenomenal consciousness, which is something that we think Dennett did not deal satisfactorily with.


Contributors to this page: KevinORegan .
Page last modified on Friday 28 of April, 2006 [11:29:23 UTC] by KevinORegan.


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ErikMyin
mechanism
on: Apr 28, 2006 [10:42] score: 0.00
Isn't it dangerous (apart from perhaps somewhat strange from a linguistic point of view) to call skill a mechanism - the one that explains consciousness. Is this not an opening of the door for similar criticisms as given, within the sensorimotor approach, of 40 Hertz oscillations or quantum microtubules as mechanisms for consciousness? For me, the reason why the sensorimotor approach is the right one for perceptual consciousness is the idea that perceptual awareness = being engaged in a perceptual action, which does away with the need for any 'generation' of conscioousness, and I somewhat fear that by calling skill a mechanism that explains consciousness, attention gets drawn away from thet idea.

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KevinORegan
Re: mechanism
on: Apr 28, 2006 [11:29] score: 0.00
> Isn't it dangerous (apart from perhaps somewhat strange from a linguistic point of view) to call skill a mechanism - the one that explains consciousness. Is this not an opening of the door for similar criticisms as given, within the sensorimotor approach, of 40 Hertz oscillations or quantum microtubules as mechanisms for consciousness? For me, the reason why the sensorimotor approach is the right one for perceptual consciousness is the idea that perceptual awareness = being engaged in a perceptual action, which does away with the need for any 'generation' of conscioousness, and I somewhat fear that by calling skill a mechanism that explains consciousness, attention gets drawn away from thet idea.

Yes I think you're right.. I've changed mechanism into concept.... Does that seem ok?



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ErikMyin
Dennett
on: Apr 28, 2006 [10:31] score: 0.00
Kevin, I would make the last sentence less comitting to the criticism of Dennett's, by saying:
"which is something that Dennett is often criticised for as not dealing satisfactorily with".



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